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Abstract 
The Single Euro Payment Area (SEPA) project eliminates the incompatibility of domestic payment 
systems across European countries. It also enforces uniform pricing between national and 
international transactions. How does this policy affect competition among European banks in the 
retail payment market? To address this issue, I explore and solve a model of non-linear price 
competition between two asymmetric banks in terms of capital by considering price discrimination in 
pre-SEPA and uniform pricing in post-SEPA under the presence of economies of scale. My results 
show that the transaction pattern has a vital role in the effect of SEPA on competition between banks. 
Competition is less intense in post-SEPA when the transaction pattern is domestically oriented. 
Moreover, comparison of pre- and post-SEPA suggests that SEPA intensifies competition when 
economies of scale are large enough. I further show that consumer surplus improves in post-SEPA. 
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The growth of international trade, cross-border e-commerce, and migration show that cross-
border retail payment
1
 is increasingly important in the last century. Many businesses serve clients 
abroad and purchase goods from international suppliers; many people make online purchases from 
international sellers, and migrants send money to their families in their home country; government 
agencies purchase from international suppliers or pay international aids. In Europe, cross-border 
payments have not been easy as domestic ones. For instance, an individual in Spain could not 
authorize a direct debit
2
 by a German company (to pay a bill, receive a salary, etc.) unless he had a 
bank account in Germany. A business needed to maintain different bank accounts in the European 
countries in which it operated in order to conform to their instructions. Moreover, the price of cross-
border payment was higher than domestic one. 
The European Commission (henceforth EC), European Payment Council (henceforth EPC), and 
the European Central Bank (henceforth ECB) have debated that the source of customers’ problems for 
making a cross-border payment in Europe was the incompatibility of domestic payment systems 
between European countries. Accordingly, the EC enforced the Single Euro Payment Area 
(henceforth SEPA) project towards the retail payment market in Europe. The SEPA project started in 
2002 with the mission of applying principles in which all non-cash euro payments are treated in 
accordance with the same rights and obligations irrespective of their location. In particular, the 
intention was to overcome the problem of incompatibility of national payment systems across Europe 
and implement uniform pricing for domestic and cross-border transactions. In fact SEPA has created 
one union-wide retail payment market in the euro area. Payment service providers such as the banking 
industry were responsible for implementing SEPA which required the adoption of common standards 
and rights at significant cost.   
Compliance with SEPA has resulted in fundamental changes in the payment system in Europe. 
Thus, it is of great importance to analyse the consequences of this policy. In this regard, the main 
concern of this paper is to address the question of how uniform pricing with respect to harmonization 
of payment systems affects competition between European banks. Analytical studies on this research 
question are almost rare. In this regard, the purpose of the present paper is to make a contribution to 
this rather undiscovered area. Since banks have the main role to execute payments, as well as being 
considerable participants in the financial markets and are important owners and users of the payment 
systems, I focus my attention on the banking industry as a proxy for payment service providers.   
To analyse the potential effects of SEPA, it is essential to consider the prevailing conditions prior 
to SEPA project. In this paper, pre-SEPA is considered as a period in which payment systems are 
diversified across countries and banks are allowed to discriminate between the price of domestic and 
cross-border payments. Post-SEPA refers to a period in which banks complied with the SEPA system 
and applied the uniform pricing for making domestic and cross-border payments.  
Given this generalized framework, I extend the duopoly model by Laffont et al. (1998a, b) 
(henceforth LRT model) who provide a theoretical framework for the telecommunication market, to  
1Cross-border retail payment is a term referring to the transfer of low value of funds between at least two different countries; 
for instance, a retail payment from Spain to Germany or from the United Kingdom to France is regarded as a cross-border 
payment. 
2Direct debit is an instruction from the payer to his bank in order to pay his debt. The payer authorizes payee to collect 
money from his account by giving advanced notice of the amounts and dates of collection. 
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consider competition between two asymmetric banks, in terms of capital, under non-linear pricing and 
in the presence of economies of scale. The large bank is defined as a bank with large capital compared 
to a small bank with low capital. The capital is intended versus the labour and is referred here to 
transaction technologies and modernization initiatives by banks. The adoption of modernization such 
as mobile wallets, Apple Pay, and so on involves a gradual reduction in banks costs (particularly, 
labour costs). The non-linear pricing consists of two prices: a fixed fee that is a subscription fee and a 
transaction price to make a payment that may depend on whether the payment is domestic or cross-
border. Kokkola (2010) among others states that economies of scale are one of the main features of 
the banking industry since they allow banks to recover their high cost of investment in infrastructure. 
Humphrey (2009) estimates the scale economies among 11 European countries like Germany, France, 
U.K, Spain, Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Denmark over 1987-2004. 
He finds that banks in the payment market are acting under economies of scale. Beccalli, Anolli, and 
Borell (2015) study the existence of economies of scale for 103 European banks from 2000 to 2011. 
They find that there are economies of scale among different banks, and they are significantly large for 
the largest banks. In this regard, I analyse competition between banks under the existence of 
economies of scale.  
The major difference between the model of this paper and the LRT model is the definition of the 
cost function. In the framework of the LRT model, it is considered that two networks have the same 
cost structures and fixed marginal cost. Here, I consider that two banks have different marginal costs 
and the large bank is cost-efficient due to the larger capital level. Based on the existing work of 
Schmiedel (2007) and Mermelstein et al. (2014), I build the cost function by taking into account the 
capital and economies of scale. In post-SEPA, payment services are consolidated
3
 and compatible 
across Europe, thus, SEPA is identified as the infrastructural project
4
. Schmiedel (2007) and 
Mermelstein et al. (2014) allow me to introduce the infrastructural change in the model through the 
cost functions. In particular, in pre-SEPA, the domestic payment systems are incompatible. This 
feature is captured by considering different marginal costs depending on payment termination: the 
domestic transaction cost is lower than the cross-border one since the latter includes connectivity cost 
to a third party. While, in post-SEPA, the compatibility between payment systems across countries 
implies the same costs per transaction for domestic and cross-border payments. However, in post-
SEPA, banks have to make substantial investments to adopt the common standards required by this 
project. I consider it as a fixed adjustment cost. 
For the sake of tractability, I take a narrower view of the cost functions introduced by 
Mermelstein et al. (2014) and only focus on the case where economies of scale equal the inverse of 
the labour share. It leads to constant marginal cost in terms of transaction volume. 
My analysis stands in two phases: pre-SEPA with price discrimination and post-SEPA with 
uniform pricing in terms of payment destination. In this setup, I analyse the impacts of SEPA on 
competition and welfare by comparing pre-SEPA with post-SEPA. Given economies of scale, I start 
the analysis in the symmetric case where the two banks have the same levels of capital.  
 
3So far, consolidation of payment services means two or more national services acting based on one standard and rule but not 
the merging of national markets. 
4Following the European Payments Council (2009), the infrastructure is defined as ‘the technology delivery system and 




Comparison of the results in pre- and post-SEPA shows that symmetric banks could not take 
advantage of SEPA, but SEPA would be beneficial for the customers because of the transaction 
prices. Welfare would improve in post-SEPA when increasing transaction volumes can offset the 
fixed adjustment cost. Then, I analyse the impacts of SEPA in the asymmetric case.  The main result 
is that the transaction pattern affects the competition between banks in post-SEPA which is consistent 
with Leibbrandt (2010) and Schaefer (2008). I show that when the transaction pattern is dominated by 
the domestic market, then competition between banks is less intense in post-SEPA. I further show that 
consumer surplus improves in post-SEPA. The effect of SEPA on welfare depends on the amount of 
fixed adjustment cost. If this cost is sufficiently small, then welfare improves in post-SEPA. On 
further analysis, I consider the case where economies of scale are improved in post-SEPA. It is 
motivated by empirical evidence that the harmonization and standardization of national payment 
systems are likely to foster economies of scale in the payment market in Europe (see, Bolt and 
Humphrey (2007), Beijnen and Bolt (2009)). The results show that if economies of scale improve, 
then SEPA intensifies competition between banks. This result is in line with the EC expectation about 
the effect of SEPA on competition between banks. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 generally describes SEPA project and 
reviews some related literature. The structure of the models in pre-SEPA and post-SEPA are laid out 
in Section 3. Section 4 analyses the competition in pre- and post-SEPA. The comparisons of pre-
SEPA with post-SEPA are shown in Section 5. Conclusion is presented in Section 6. Appendix 
gathers proofs.  
 
2. Implementation of SEPA and Related Literature. 
Before the introduction of SEPA, each European country was served by its own domestic 
payment system that was created under the national rules and standards, and therefore was 
incompatible among countries. For example, there was ‘Iberpay’ payment system in Spain, ‘Vocalink’ 
in the United Kingdom, and ‘Wordline’ in France. Therefore, a third-party like a correspondent bank 
was required to link domestic payment systems in order to make a cross-border payment, i.e., the 
correspondent bank provided international transaction services on behalf of the domestic payment 
systems. 
 Figure 1 shows the process of a cross-border payment in pre-SEPA. A payer and a payee are 
located at two different countries namely country A and country B. A payer is an individual (or a 
business, or a government agency) who gives the payment order to his bank and allows them to make 
a payment from his account. A payee is a beneficiary (could be an individual or a business or a 
government agency) who has received a fund to his account. The payer’s bank receives a payment 
order. It then transfers information to the domestic payment system. The payment system settles the 
payment order based on domestic rules and technical standards. Then, the payment order goes to the 
correspondent bank in country A. If the fund needs to convert to the local currency, it is sent to the 
second correspondent bank in country B. Ultimately, the fund transfers to the payee’s bank via the 
domestic payment’s system of country B.  
Figure 2 shows the process of a domestic payment in pre-SEPA. The payer and payee are located 
in the same country (for instance, country A) and the payment executes through the domestic payment 









   
  
Figure 2. Domestic payment processes in pre-SEPA.  
Country A 
 
    
In pre-SEPA, the price of a cross-border payment was significantly higher than a domestic one. 
The EC and ECB argued that the price discrimination was due to the complexity of the cross-border 
payment systems. Moreover, the EC found that the price of cross-border payments varied significantly 
across European countries. The evidence provided by the EC in 2001 shows that the price of 
transferring €100 from Luxembourg to another European country was €9.58, from Germany was 
€11.93, from Spain was €20.56, and from Portugal was €31.04 (EC’s survey IP/01/992, 2001). From 
the EC point of view, the price diversification was problematic because it prevented an integrated 
market in Europe.  
To overcome these problems, the first attempt after the introduction of the physical Euro as a 
single (cash) payment instrument across Europe was to enforce banks to charge the same transaction 
prices for domestic and cross-border payment up to €12,500, in 2002 (Regulation (EC) 
No.2560/2001). This regulation covered cross-border credit transfer and cross-border electronic 
payment. In 2007, the EC expanded the scope of uniform pricing for cross-border direct debit 
(Directive 2007/64/EC). In 2009, the uniform pricing regulation was enlarged to execute up to 
€50,000 (Regulation (EC) No.924/2009). The adoption of uniform pricing was an important step in 
reaching SEPA. The next step was to overcome the problem of diversity of the national payment 
systems, such as different standards, technologies, and rules across countries and form an integrated 
financial market in Europe to simplify the non-cash payment. In this regard, the last important stage 
of adopting SEPA was to implement the regulation (EC) No.260/2012 of the Commission and 
European Parliament. This regulation established the technical and business requirements for direct 
debit and credit transactions and cancelled €50,000 ceiling. All banks were obliged to comply with 
SEPA. They must adopt the common standards and rights that come with a significant cost. Based on 
the definition of the ECB (2009) ‘SEPA is an area, in which consumers, companies and other 
economic actors will be able to make and receive payments in euro, whether within or across national 
borders, with the same basic conditions, rights and obligations, regardless of their location’
5
. 
5SEPA consists of 34 countries which are 28 member states of the European Union and 6 other territories: Iceland, Monaco, 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway and San Marino. Some countries such as the UK, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, 































Under the SEPA system, there is no difference between domestic and cross-border euro 
payments; all euro payments in the SEPA zone are treated like domestic ones. All banks are obliged 
to make cross-border payment as cheap and easy as a domestic payment. Figure 3 shows domestic and 
cross-border payments are executed under a single system in post-SEPA. 








The scope of influence of SEPA was extensive, so that retail payment market, every individual, 
business, and government agency in the euro area were affected by this project. In post-SEPA, 
customers rely on one bank account to make cashless euro payments to any payee under the same 
conditions, regardless of their location in the SEPA zone. It enables them to pay and receive funds 
from other SEPA countries without any extra costs when they travel, study, work, purchase goods and 
services. Businesses can integrate different bank accounts among different European countries into a 
unique one, thus they may be able to save cost and time for making payments. In general, SEPA 
provides better payment services since payments are executed within a certain time, the costs of 
making payments are clear and there is no hidden fees (banks are not allowed to make any deficit of 
the transferred amount), and payments are safe through SEPA via IBAN and BIC
6
.   
Although the analytical literature related to my research question is scarce, there are several 
studies that attempt to enhance understanding of the opportunities and costs of SEPA for customers 
and banks. These studies apply different methodologies. Some of them have examined the effects of 
SEPA from a theoretical or empirical standpoint, while others are interview-based studies. 
 
Leibbrandt (2010) studies the effect of compatibility of Europe’s payment systems on bank 
competition and welfare. He assumed that there are two equal sized countries served by two banks, 
one in each country. Moreover, he assumed that banks do not make price discrimination based on 
termination and that the marginal cost of a payment transaction is zero. He considers the case where 
two banks compete in two stages: in the first stage, they decide to comply or not with the compatible 
system and in the second stage, they compete on prices. Results show that the transaction patterns 
have the main role in bank’s desire to choose the compatible system, i.e., if the transaction patterns 
are dominated by domestic transactions, banks maintain the incompatible system to avoid migration 
costs. In contrast, if this cost is zero, then banks make more profit with the compatible system than 
with the incompatible system but consumer surplus is lower due to higher prices charged by banks.  
In another work, Schaefer (2008) studies the economic effect of SEPA project on the banking 
industry and welfare. He applies a spatial bank competition model between two banks and focuses on 
 
6IBAN is an abbreviation of ‘International Bank Account Number’ which is a single standard for identifying and validating 
an account with a bank in Europe. A single bank identifier entails ‘Bank Identifier Code (BIC)’ that is also called Swift code. 









SEPA payment system  
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the cost implications to study SEPA-effects on welfare. From an analytical perspective, he considers 
the choice of adopting SEPA by comparing two cases, ‘high initial investment cost and low cost of 
cross-border payment’ against ‘low or zero investment cost and high cost of cross-border payment’. 
From the results, he suggests that adopting SEPA may be welfare-enhancing if the initial investment 
cost reduces or the share of the cross-border payment is high enough to cover this cost. He also finds 
it welfare-enhancing due to intensifying cross-border competition between banks through reducing 
entry barriers. He extends his model to consider that foreign bank with cost advantage enters the 
market. He concludes that in spite of the increasing welfare, without public intervention, banks would 
not adopt SEPA since they suffer a considerable adjustment cost. In a complementary work, 
Kemppainen (2008) evaluates economic effects of SEPA in a spatial competition model in the debit 
card market. He considers two countries covered by two incompatible payment networks in pre-SEPA 
and compatible in post-SEPA. In pre-SEPA, customers only can use their cards in their home 
network, while they can use their cards both in home and foreign networks in post-SEPA. The model 
is built based on some SEPA elements such as the increased number of customers in demand-side and 
the SEPA adjustment cost in supply-side. The results show that SEPA causes an increase in prices, 
larger network size, and greater consumer surplus.  Conversely, profit and welfare increase if SEPA 
adjustment cost is ignored. Furthermore, the model reveals that SEPA is not enough to lead to a fully 
competitive market. However, these studies do not further discuss the setting of price in pre- and post-
SEPA that affect the profitability of banks and welfare. 
In empirical work, Todorovic, Sedlarevic and Tomic (2017) evaluate the effects of SEPA on the 
performance of the banking industry among 17 European countries in the period 2002-2012. They 
find that the benefits of SEPA cannot cover its costs in the short term, while in the long term, SEPA 
will improve the performance of the banking industry.  
A number of other contributions assess the economic impact of SEPA by focusing on survey- 
and interview-based studies. The analysis undertaken by Schmiedel (2007) provides insights into the 
economic impact of SEPA. In particular, he studies the benefits and costs of SEPA for the banking 
industry. For this purpose, he applies a questionnaire and interview-based fact-finding exercise from 
the European Central Bank. He finds that in the long term when national systems are completely 
replaced with the SEPA system, the cost of banks will decline because of potential economies of scale 
and scope. Furthermore, the revenue of banks will be affected by increasing competition as entry 
barriers in the market. In 2014, the EC asked PWC group to provide a report related to the benefits 
and opportunities of SEPA for stakeholders such as banks, companies, and customers. In an 
interview-based study, the PWC group states that companies and customers take advantage of SEPA 
at the expense of banks. In this study, it considers three categories of banks namely global bank that 
has global operations, regional bank that has regional operations and local bank that consists of 
smaller domestic banks. The results show that the local bank may have less opportunity to benefit 
from SEPA while the global and regional banks can attract more transaction volumes and make an 
additional profit in post-SEPA. The reason is that the local bank operates on a smaller scale than other 
banks and therefore would not afford to cover the SEPA cost. 
 
  Some important economic aspects of the SEPA are missing in previous works such as price 
setting and cost efficiency due to the consolidation of national payment systems. The present paper 
attempts to fill these gaps by analyzing a duopoly model. In the following, I present the main aspects 
of the model. 
 
3.  Model Specification. 
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In this section, I describe the structure of the model in the presence of economies of scale. I first 
characterize pre-SEPA and then post-SEPA phases. In pre-SEPA, the domestic payment systems are 
diversified across European countries and banks charge different transaction prices for making 
domestic and cross-border payments. In post-SEPA, the domestic payment systems are homogeneous 
across countries and banks charge the same transaction prices for making domestic and cross-border 
payments.  
 
I consider a country located in the SEPA zone that is served by two asymmetric banks, a large 
bank with a large level of capital and a small bank with a small level of capital indexed by     
     , that offer payment accounts. Customers located in this country subscribe only to one bank to 
conduct domestic and cross-border payments. I assume that customers are homogeneous and 
uniformly distributed on the segment [0, 1]. Banks are located at either extreme; w.l.o.g. I assume that 
the large bank is located at 0 and the small bank is located at 1. Moreover, suppose that two banks 
serve all customers, that is, there is full coverage. 
 
3.1. Pre-SEPA Phase.  
Three-part tariff. To handle a payment, each bank charges three-part tariff            ̂  , where 
   is a fixed fee (or subscription fee),    is a domestic transaction price for each inter-bank payment 
inside the country and  ̂  is a cross-border transaction price for each inter-bank payment to another 
country located in the SEPA zone.  To simplify the analysis, I assume that intra-bank transactions are 
free of charge. Banks are allowed to charge different transaction prices based on the payment 
destination, i.e., the transaction price for a domestic payment can differ from a cross-border payment: 
    ̂ . The non-linear pricing scheme is motivated by the European Union (EU) report on retail 
financial services in 2009
7
. The study assesses the level of bank fees for 224 banks across the EU-27 
including basic annual fees (e.g., package fees and account maintenance charges), account fees (e.g., 
over-the-counter transactions, accounts’ movements, internet and phone banking, etc.), credit transfer 
charges (e.g., reception and transmission of credit transfers, standing orders including setup, 
modification and closure, etc.), direct debit charges (e.g., fees for setting up direct debits, sending and 
closure), among others. Accordingly, in my terminology, fixed fees refer to annual fees and 
transaction prices refer to credit or debit transfer charges.  
 
For the sake of tractability, I assume that all inter-bank transactions have the same size, but 
volumes or number of transactions do depend on transaction prices. The total volume of transaction 
is        ̂  , where    is the domestic transaction volume and  ̂  is the cross-border transaction 
volume at bank  8,9. 
 
Individual demand. The customer’s problem is to maximise utility       ̂          ̂   
   
   ̂ 
  
 
    where        ,    and    is the fixed surplus from being connected to either bank. 
Suppose    is large enough that customers always choose to have a bank account. The individual 
demands are given by 
  
   
    and 
  
  ̂ 
  ̂ which result in            and  ̂  ̂      ̂ . 
 
7 See European Commission 2009, EU report on retail financial services: fact sheet, MEMO/09/402. 
8 Equivalently, one could assume that each customer makes one transaction of size  . 
9 I omit the role of interchange fees that are paid for interconnection by a bank to its rival in a card payment which allows me 
to focus on the comparison between pre-SEPA and post-SEPA. The role of interchange fees in the banking industry is 
studied in Shy (2012) and Wright (2004); for a survey of recent contributions on this topic see Verdier (2009). 
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The indirect utility of payment or customer’s variable net surplus is                  , 
yielding 
 
     
      
 
    
 
where       is the domestic surplus and    ̂   is the cross-border surplus. The derivative of indirect 
utility with respect to the transaction price is 
  
  
   ; the indirect utility strictly decreases with the 
transaction price. Without price discrimination, the surplus equals         .   
 
Market share. Banks offer payment services that are horizontally differentiated   la Hotelling and 
there is full coverage, i.e., each bank can offer its services to all customers. The net surplus offered by 
bank   is: 
            ̂      
 
with        .Then, the net utility that a customer   derives from subscribing to bank   is: 
       |    | 
Parameter   is product differentiation. Customers subscribe to a bank from which they obtain a higher 
net utility. Since      and     , a customer located at   is indifferent to subscribe to the large or 
small bank if and only if 
                 
The term    is the transportation cost of going to the large bank and        is the transportation 
cost of going to the small bank. Transportation cost is used here as a means to capture product 
differentiation. Solving for  , I obtain the market share of the large bank as follows: 
                                    
 
 
                                                                      (1) 
Parameter   
 
  
   is the degree of substitutability between the two banks. Since there is full 
participation (i.e., each customer subscribes to one bank), the market share of the small bank is 




Consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is determined by 
                                                               
 
 
   
    




   
    
   is the customer disutility from not being able to subscribe to his preferred 
services.  
Cost function. By following Schmiedel (2007), I consider that banks incur two types of costs to 
execute a payment: ‘Distribution/Maintenance Cost’ (as a fixed cost) and ‘Processing Cost’ (as a 
variable cost).  
Distribution/Maintenance Cost. Banks incur the fixed cost,  ,̅ to serve each customer. This cost 





Processing Cost. In pre-SEPA, each country has a national payment system with particular 
requirements in terms of technology, standards, and services. Thus, banks use different methods to 
execute domestic and cross-border payments
11
. As a result, the processing cost of each payment 
depends on its destination. In this regard, there are two kinds of processing costs: the cost of the 
domestic transaction (     ) and the cost of the cross-border transaction ( ̂  ̂  ). In order to introduce 
the economies of scale and capital in the model, I adopt the marginal cost function proposed by 
Mermelstein et al. (2014). From this perspective, processing costs are defined as follows: 










     
 










     
   ̂ . 
The marginal costs of the domestic and cross-border transactions are thus given by: 
                                                       
 





      




     
                                                        (3) 
                                                    ̂  ̂   
 










     
                                                     (4) 
with        . Equations (3) and (4) show that marginal costs are function of transaction volumes. 
Parameter     represents economies of scale,          is the capital share ((   ) is the labour 
share)
12
,    is the capital owned by bank   to settle a payment. Remind that the large bank is cost-
efficient due to having a larger capital level. The parameter   shows the connectivity cost to execute a 
cross-border payment. It is worth noting that if there is a bilateral agreement between banks in order 
to execute payments through one payment system, then    , which means that the domestic and 
cross-border payments execute in the same ways. In this case, the third party does not have any role 
and there is no problem with incompatible systems. As long as the main concern of the present paper 
is to analyse the effect of harmonization of payment systems through SEPA, I consider the case with  
   .   
 
Profit function. Under the price discrimination, bank  ’s profit is given by: 
                                                      ̂  ̂   ̂ +     ̅                                            (5) 
The profit consists of two parts: the profit from the execution of payments and the profit from the 
fixed fee.  
Welfare. Welfare is defined as follows: 
                                                                                                                         (6) 
10Based on the directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and Council on the prevention of the use of the financial 
system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, banks have to monitor accounts. 
11For more details see Park (2006). 
12 The variable cost function comes from the Cobb-Douglas production function                  : the share of output 




3.2. Post-SEPA Phase. 
Two-part tariff. In post-SEPA, banks are constrained to set uniform pricing, i.e., they must charge 
the same price for domestic and cross-border payments. Therefore, each bank sets two-part tariff 
 ̃    ̃   ̃   where  ̃  is a fixed fee (or subscription fee) and  ̃  is a transaction price for each 
transaction regardless of its destination. 
Individual demand. Following similar steps as in pre-SEPA case, total individual demand function 
in post-SEPA can be written as  
 ̃       ̃       ̃   
which is twice the domestic payment at price  ̃ . Under uniform pricing, the indirect utility of 
payment or consumer’s variable net surplus is  ̃  ̃      ̃    ̃   ̃  ̃, yielding  
 




   ̃.  
 
Market share. It is as pre-SEPA case where: 
 
 ̃    ̃  ̃    ̃  
 




   
 . The net utility of customer   from subscribing to bank   is: 
 ̃    ̃   |    | 
where         and      and     . The market share is given by the location of the customer that 
is indifferent between the two banks: 
 ̃      ̃         
Consequently, 
                                                             ̃  
 
 
    ̃   ̃                                                                (7) 
As before, parameter   
 
  
  is the degree of substitutability between two banks. Under full coverage 
assumption, market shares add up to unity:  ̃     ̃ . 
 
Consumer surplus. Consumer surplus is as in (2).                               
Cost function.  The consolidation of national payment systems in post-SEPA leads to a change in 
the cost structure of each bank. The following categories are distinguished: 
Fixed Adjustment Cost. Banks incur a fixed adjustment cost to comply with SEPA,   . This cost is due 
to the technology investments required for SEPA such as the cost associated with updating and 
upgrading to new technologies. To simplify the analysis, I assume that this cost is the same for both 
large and small banks. 
12 
 
Distribution/Maintenance Cost. As pre-SEPA, serving a customer involves a fixed cost,  ̅.  
Processing Cost. Regardless of a payment destination, in post-SEPA, the processing cost of each 
payment is defined as 










     
. 
The marginal cost is thus given by: 
 ̃  ̃   
 





      




     
                                                            (8) 
In post-SEPA, the payment systems are compatible across countries leading to the same processing 
costs per transaction regardless of termination (Bolt and Humphrey, 2007). Equation (8) shows the 
cost of cross-border payment is decreased since there is no connectivity cost,     . 
 
Profit function. In post-SEPA, bank   profit is: 
                                                      ̃   ̃   ̃  ̃   ̃   ̃    ̅                                               (9)  
where   is the fixed adjustment cost. Again the profit consists of profit from the execution of 
payments and fixed fees.  
Welfare. Welfare in post-SEPA is given by (6).    
                       
4. Non-Linear Price Competition. 
This section provides a general analysis of non-linear price competition in pre- and post-SEPA. 
4.1.Competition in Pre-SEPA. 
In pre-SEPA, each bank maximizes its profit by optimally setting            ̂  . By following the 
lines of Laffont et al. (1998), I analyse the case where banks compete in prices,      ̂ , and    rather 
than in      ̂ , and    due to the one-to-one relationship between    and   . By solving systems 
   
   
   and 
   
  ̂ 
   for    and  ̂  from equation (5),  I get: 
                                                     
                                                                            (10) 
                                                    ̂ 
   ̂                                                                         (11) 
Equations (10) and (11) show that banks set transaction prices at the marginal costs and 
consequently, make price discrimination for domestic and cross-border payments in pre-SEPA. Note 
that the marginal cost is a function of price, so equations define implicitly optimal transaction prices: 
it can be easily shown that   
     and  ̂ 
   ̂  have the unique solution (see proof of Proposition (1) 
in Appendix). The optimal fixed fee and market share are characterized in the following Proposition.  
Proposition1. In pre-SEPA, at the equilibrium, transaction prices equal marginal costs,   
     and 
 ̂ 
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with        ,     
        
       
 
 
     
,    
        
       
 
 
     
, and   (
 
      
).  
Proof: See Appendix.    
The fixed fee and the market share are functions of transaction volumes. Depending on the value 
of   ,   
  and   
  increase or decrease with transaction volumes. If either   
 
 




    and   is large enough,   
  increases with    and  ̂ . In contrast,   
  decreases with    and  ̂  if 
   , or    , or      but     and   is large enough. Under these ranges of  ,   
  increases 
with    and  ̂  and decreases with    and  ̂ . When     , the bank with greater transaction volumes 
sets higher fixed fee and gains higher market share than the rival.  
Note that setting fixed fee depends on the degree of substitutability between banks. In the extreme 
case where   tends to zero, banks’ fixed fees tend to infinite and the market is split equally given the 
full participation assumption. Competition in fixed fees is thus intensified as sigma increases, i.e., as 
the degree of substitutability increases. In this case, a bank with greater transaction volumes than the 
rival has a greater market share.  
The profit of bank   at the equilibrium is given by: 
                                     
    
    (  
 
  ̂ 
 
)   
 
   ̅                                                (14) 
with    
        
       
 
 
     
, and   (
 
      
). 
Consider the extreme case where   tends to infinite, then   tends to zero. In this case the domestic 
transaction price equals zero but the cross-border one equals  . In this case, banks compete on fixed 
fees. The profit is given by:  
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 . The large bank sets smaller 
fixed fee because of higher    and has greater market share than the small bank. Increasing 
asymmetry between banks leads to the large bank makes more profit when   is sufficiently small: for 
sufficiently small  , the sign of  
   
 
   
 
   
        
 




   
 
     
 
 
   
 




  ̅  is positive. It shows 
that when the product differentiation is high, then the large bank makes more profit because of higher 
    Figure 4 shows this extreme case: the fixed fee, market share, and profit are plotted as a function 
of  . If the degree of substitutability between banks is large, then the large bank sets smaller fixed fee 
than the small bank. As a result, more customers join the large bank and consequently the large bank 
gains more market share. The profit of banks decreases with  , which is due to the higher degree of 
competition in the market.  
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Figure 4. Behaviour of asymmetric banks when      in pre-SEPA.
 
                     ̅            
 
4.1.Competition in Post-SEPA. 
 
Under uniform pricing, each bank maximizes its profit by optimally setting two-part tariff ( ̃   ̃ ). 
Given the one-to-one relationship between  ̃  and  ̃ , I solve  
  ̃ 
  ̃ 
   for  ̃  from equation (9) and 
obtain: 
                                                                          ̃ 
   ̃                                                                     (15) 
Equation (15) shows that banks set the transaction price at the marginal cost in post-SEPA. The 
following Proposition characterizes the fixed fee and the market share in the equilibrium. 
Proposition 2.  In post-SEPA, at the equilibrium, the transaction price equals marginal cost,  ̃ 
   ̃ , 
and the fixed fee and the market share for each bank equal: 
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with    
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, and   (
 
      
). 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Similar to pre-SEPA, depending on the value of  , the fixed fee and market share in post-SEPA 
increase or decrease with transaction volumes. If either   
 
 
, or    , or   
 
 
 but     and   is 
large enough, then  ̃ 
  increases with  ̃ . For   
 
 
, or    , or   
 
 
 but     and   is large 
enough, then  ̃ 
  decreases with  ̃ . In this case,  ̃ 
  increases with  ̃  but decreases with  ̃ . Similar to 
pre-SEPA, when    ,  ̃ 
 and  ̃ 
  increases with  ̃  but decreases with  ̃ , and the large bank sets 




The profit of bank   at the equilibrium is given by: 
                                      ̃ 
   ̃ 
     ̃ 
  
  ̃ 
   ̅                                                         (18) 
where    
        
       
 
 
     
,   (
 
      
), and   is the fixed adjustment cost. In the exterme case where 
   , the profit is: 
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 . Similar to pre-SEPA, banks 
compete on fixed fees when    . If asymmetry between banks increases, then the profit of the large 
bank increases with    when   is sufficiently small. Figure 5 shows the behaviour of asymmetric 
banks at equilibrium as a function of   in post-SEPA. Similar to pre-SEPA, in this case, the large 
bank sets smaller fixed fee and has greater market share than the small bank.  
Figure 5. Behaviour of asymmetric banks when      in post-SEPA. 
 
               ̅               . 
 
The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of SEPA on competition between banks. When 
   , the comparison between pre-SEPA and post-SEPA shows that the large bank loses market 
share but the small bank gains market share in post-SEPA. In other words, the SEPA project 
intensifies competition between banks when   is large enough. When    , the comparison is 
complicated because for values of   different from 0, marginal costs take different functional forms in 
terms of transaction volumes as follows. 
      
    
 
 
   
,  ̂     
    
 ̂
 
   
  ,  ̃      
    
 ̃
 
                  
For instance, if    , then marginal costs are a linear function of transaction volumes as    
   
      ,  ̂     
     ̂   ,and  ̃      
     ̃ . In another example, if      , then marginal 
costs are a nonlinear function of transaction volumes as         
        
    ,  ̂       
       ̂ 
     
 , and  ̃         
       ̃ 
    . The diversity of marginal cost functions leads to obtain multiple 
solutions for transaction prices which complicate the analysis. To keep the model tractable, I take a 
narrower view and only focus on the case where    . In this case,   
 
   
 (   ), the marginal 
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costs are constant in terms of the transaction volumes. This assumption still captures the existence of 
the economies of scale
13
. 
     
   ,  ̂    
     ,  ̃    
                    
 
5. Pre-SEPA vs. Post-SEPA. 
This section analyses effects of SEPA on competition between banks and welfare when    . 
Then I expand analysis by considering the case where   tends to infinity and study effects of 
economies of scale on equilibrium. 
5.1. Comparison between pre-SEPA and post-SEPA when   
 
   
 . 
When the marginal costs are constant in terms of the transaction volumes, then the optimal 
transaction prices are given by 
                       
    
   ,  ̂ 
    
       ̃ 
    
                                         (19) 
It notes that the optimal transaction prices decrease with the capital level since    . This means 
that the large bank sets lower transaction prices than the small bank in pre- and post-SEPA. 
Comparison of optimal prices in pre-SEPA with post-SEPA shows that the transaction price in post-
SEPA equals the domestic transaction price in pre-SEPA (owing to the same marginal cost) and 
smaller than the cross-border transaction price in pre-SEPA:   
   ̃ 
   ̂ 
 . In other words, SEPA 
affects the cross-border transaction prices but not domestic ones. Since transaction prices are set at 
marginal costs, banks earn zero profit from the execution of payments but they earn positive profit 
from fixed fees. To gain our understating regarding the effect of SEPA on banks and customers, I start 
with the symmetric case as a benchmark and then expand my analysis to the asymmetric case.   
Symmetric banks:   




 (    ̃  
 
 
 , the optimal transaction prices are 
    ̃         ̂        . 
From equations (12) and (16), it is obtained that the fixed fee in post-SEPA equals pre-SEPA with 
    ̃  
 
  
  ̅. 
It shows that SEPA has no effect on the fixed fee in the symmetric case.  
The profit of banks in pre- and post-SEPA is given by    
 
  
  and  ̃   
 
  
  , respectively. 
For each    , SEPA results in lower profit for banks. In contrast, SEPA favours customers in the 
symmetric case since 
13 
When    , the average total cost (
    ̅
 
) decreases with transaction volumes and the average variable cost equals 
marginal cost (
   
  
   ). 
17 
 
    
    ̂ 
 
 ( ̅  
 
  




Observes that in post-SEPA customers take advantage of lowering transaction prices while banks 
must bear the fixed adjustment cost. The reason is that the harmonization of the national payment 
systems in post-SEPA leads to decrease cross-border transaction prices, thus, the transaction volumes 
are greater in post-SEPA than pre-SEPA (   
    ̂ 
 
 . Consequently, consumer surplus is greater in 
post-SEPA than pre-SEPA. The effect of SEPA on welfare depends on the value of   . Welfare may 
improve in post-SEPA when the gain in consumer surplus offset the bank’s fixed investments.  
Asymmetric banks: 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the effect of SEPA on asymmetric banks with      . In order 
to compare the results in pre- and post-SEPA, I recall  ̃ 
     
 . The next Proposition establishes the 
relationship between tariffs of the large bank and small bank in pre- and post-SEPA.    
Proposition 3. For      and      , at the equilibrium I have 
In pre-SEPA: 
(i)   
    
 ,   ̂ 
   ̂ 
  but   
    






   
   ̂ 
      
   ̂ 
  
 
  ̅               
and   
  increases with    but decreases with   .  
In post-SEPA: 
(ii)   ̃ 
   ̃ 
  but  ̃ 
   ̃ 
   where  






    
 )
 
  ̅             
and  ̃ 
  increases with    but decreases with   .  
Proof. See Appendix. 
The comparison of tariffs between pre- and post-SEPA shows that the large bank sets its 
transaction prices below the small bank, while the small bank sets its fixed fee below the large bank. 
This is due to the trade-off between transaction prices and fixed fees, so that where the transaction 
prices are low, the fixed fee is high and vice versa. The reason is that transaction prices are set at 
marginal costs so as to maximize consumer surplus, which banks then extract through the fixed fee. 
Since the large bank has a lower marginal cost, its transaction price is lower and its fixed fee is larger 
than that of the small bank. Proposition (3) shows that when asymmetry between banks increases, the 
large bank increases its fixed fee. The reason is that increasing asymmetry between banks makes the 
large bank relatively more efficient and consequently allows it to set lower transaction prices and a 
higher fixed fee. In contrast, if asymmetry between banks decreases then the competitive advantage of 
the large bank diminishes, and the difference between fixed fees becomes smaller. 
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Next, I discuss market shares. By inserting the optimal transaction prices and fixed fees into 
equations (13) and (17), I get the market share of bank i in pre- and post-SEPA, which are 
respectively:   
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                                                              (20) 




   
  
    
 
 
                                                              (21) 
with          . The above equations point that for each       the large bank with greater 
transaction volumes has greater market share than the small bank in pre- and post-SEPA. The 
difference between market shares of the large bank and the small bank increases with  , the less 
differentiated the products are. A closer look at Proposition (3) and equations (20) and (21) tells us 
that   
     
 
   ̅  and  ̃ 
     ̃
 
 
  ̅ . Next, I use this relationship to determine the profit of banks 
in the pre- and post-SEPA. 
Proposition 4. At the equilibrium, the large bank has greater market share and earns more profit than 












     
with   
     
 
   ̅  and  ̃ 
     ̃
 
 
  ̅ .      
Proof. See Appendix. 
Since transaction prices are set at marginal costs, banks earn profit from fixed fees in pre- and 
post-SEPA. Since   
  increases with    and  ̂  but decreases with    and  ̂ , the bank with greater 
transaction volumes earns more profit than the rival. Moreover, similar to the effect of   on market 
shares of banks, the difference between profits of banks increases with  .  
Let’s define   
 ̂   ̂ 
     
, the ratio of cross-border transaction volumes to domestic ones. This 
expression is important in my analysis since it measures asymmetry between the two phases. 
Corollary (1) summarizes the comparison of the performance of banks in pre- and post-SEPA. 
Corollary 1. For       and given  , SEPA results in  ̃ 
    
   ̂ 
  with          , then 
i) The large bank (small bank) sets higher (lower) fixed fee in post-SEPA than pre-SEPA as  
   .  
ii) Given    , the large bank (small bank) has greater (lower) market share and 
consequently makes more profit in post-SEPA than pre-SEPA with sufficiently small  . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Corollary (1) shows that the transaction volume pattern plays an important role in determining the 
effects of SEPA on competition between banks. In my analysis,   is always lower than one. It shows 
that the share of cross-border transaction volumes is smaller than the domestic ones since the 
domestic transactions are cheaper than the cross-border ones. This is consistent with Leibbrandt 
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(2010) who explains that the share of cross-border transactions is significantly lower than domestic 
ones for most countries, and it is around 1-2%. Under this transaction volume pattern, the large bank 
gains market share in post-SEPA since the marginal cost advantage of the large bank reinforces the 
differences between banks. Thus, competition between banks is less intense in post-SEPA and for 
sufficiently small  , the large bank makes more profit than pre-SEPA.  
At the equilibrium, consumer surplus in pre- and post-SEPA are: 
      
 (
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 (
  







     
  )   ̅ 
  ̃   ̃ 
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    ̃ 
  )   ̅ 
Figure 6 illustrates consumer surplus in pre- and post-SEPA as a function of  . Figure 6-a shows 
the net surplus offered by the large bank, Figure 6-b shows the net surplus offered by the small bank, 
Figure 6-c shows the customer disutility, and Figure 6-d shows the accumulation of three former 
figures that is total consumer surplus. In pre-SEPA, when   increases, the net surpluses offered by the 
large bank and the small bank do not change significantly, but the consumer disutility increases. 
Therefore consumer surplus decreases with   in pre-SEPA. In post-SEPA, the situation is somewhat 
different. The net surplus offered by the large bank increases with   but the net surplus offered by the 
small bank decreases. Similar to pre-SEPA, the consumer disutility increases with  . As a result, 
consumer surplus decreases with  . Comparison of consumer surplus (Figure (6-d)) in pre- and post-
SEPA shows that SEPA results in greater consumer surplus. The two banks offered greater net surplus 
in post-SEPA than pre-SEPA but the consumer disutility is almost the same as pre-SEPA. 
Consequently, consumer surplus improves in post-SEPA.  
 
Welfare in pre- and post-SEPA are: 
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Figure 6. Components of consumer surplus in pre- and post-SEPA. 
 




Figure 7 illustrates welfare in pre- and post-SEPA. When the fixed adjustment cost is sufficiently 
small, then welfare improves in post-SEPA since consumer surplus improves. If the fixed adjustment 
cost is large, then welfare decreases in post-SEPA and can be even negative. In this case, both banks 
lose profit since they are not enabled to cover this cost.  Literature has estimated various amounts for 
the fixed adjustment cost. For instance, the ECB (2019) estimated this cost at around GBP 10.2 billion 
or €15.3 billion; Boston Consulting Group (2006) estimated this cost around €5 billion. In contrast, 
PWC group estimated the net annual saving by banks is €5.9 billion without considering the fixed 
adjustment cost for the period 2014-2020. Thus, if the fixed adjustment cost is depreciated over some 
years, then SEPA may be profitable for banks. In this case, welfare would improve in post-SEPA. 
In the following, I study how the performance of banks changes when economies of scale improve. 
 
Figure 7. Welfare comparison in pre- and post-SEPA.
 
                     ̅            
 
5.2.Impact of Economies of Scale. 
Concerning the economies of scale, I have assumed that it was the same in pre- and post-SEPA. 
Following the literature, economies of scale are likely to foster as a consequence of SEPA. Bolt and 
Humphrey (2007) and Beijnen and Bolt (2009) state that economies of scale are expected to improve 
in post-SEPA as a result of spurring consolidation among European payment systems. Because 
  
 
   
, in my model the higher economies of scale are achieved when the capital share is relatively 
larger than the labour share. It leads to a reduction in the marginal costs. McKinsey (2005) points out 
that the potential cost saving from further consolidation in the payment market and consequently 
fostering economies of scale is around 25% in some European countries. For sufficiently large 
economies of scale, pre-SEPA domestic transaction prices and post-SEPA transaction prices equal 
zero,   
   ̃ 
   , since the marginal cost tends to zero. But the cross-border transaction price in pre-
SEPA equals   which is the connectivity cost to execute the cross-border payment. In the symmetric 
case, fostering economies of scale has no effect on banks’ profitability, but it results in increasing 
consumer surplus since there are more transaction volumes in post-SEPA than pre-SEPA. The 
following Corollary establishes the effect of improving economies of scale on the equilibrium in the 
asymmetric case.   
 
   Corollary 2. The increase in economies of scale as a consequence of SEPA results in 
1- diminishing asymmetry between banks; for sufficiently large economies of scale the two 
banks will have the same market share and earn equal profit.  
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2- Consumer surplus converges to a certain amount. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The above results are illustrated by means of numerical simulations in Figure 8. Here, the 
equilibria is plotted as a function of economies of scale. Parameter values are as follows:        
                ̅           . I shall further simplify the analysis by assuming that the fixed 
adjustment cost is arbitrarily set to zero as it does not affect the optimal transaction prices, thus    . 
If this cost is larger than zero, then profit and welfare in post-SEPA will decrease accordingly. The 
fostering in economies of scale results in downward pressure on the transaction prices. Figure 8-a and 
8-c show that in the range    , the fixed fee and the market share of the large bank is greater in 
post-SEPA while the fixed fee and the market share of the small bank are smaller in post-SEPA. The 
reason is that transaction volumes of the large bank are greater than transaction volumes of the rival in 
this range of  . Moreover, it is observed that when    , in post-SEPA, the large bank corners the 
market as it has market share around 1, and the small bank loses almost all its market share, but in the 
range of    , the large bank loses market share in post-SEPA while the small bank gains some 
market share. Therefore, if economies of scale foster in post-SEPA, then SEPA is pro-competitive. 
Figure 8-b shows that the ratio of cross-border transactions to domestic ones is lower than 1 that is 
consistent with the results of Corollary (1). Figure 8-d presents the profit of banks that follow the 
same path as their market shares. Figures 8-e and 8-f show that consumer surplus and welfare are 
improved in post-SEPA and increase till economies of scale reach a sufficiently large value and 
remain constant afterwards. Consumers benefit due to lower transaction prices and fixed fees that 
result from greater economies of scale. The figures depict that for sufficiently large  , the asymmetry 
between banks reduces and both banks make the same profit in the market. 




The present paper has examined the effect of SEPA on competition between two asymmetric 
banks in the presence of economies of scale. Based on available empirical evidence, the paper has 
considered two phases: pre-SEPA where payment systems are nationally diversified and banks are 
allowed to discriminate between transaction price of domestic and cross-border payments and post-
SEPA where the national payment systems are compatible and banks apply uniform pricing for 
making domestic and cross-border payments. In post-SEPA, all banks are obliged to make a cross-
22 
 
border payment as cheap and easy as a domestic one. In this sense, there is no difference between 
domestic and cross-border euro payments and all euro payments in the SEPA zone are treated as 
domestic ones.  
   The results have shown that both banks set their transaction prices at the marginal costs. I found 
that in one extreme case where economies of scale tend to infinity, the pre-SEPA domestic transaction 
price and the post-SEPA transaction price equal zero, but the pre-SEPA cross-border transaction price 
is equal to connectively cost. In this case, banks compete on fixed fees and the large bank sets a lower 
fixed fee than the small bank resulting in greater market share and profit in pre- and post-SEPA. The 
comparison of market shares in pre- and post-SEPA has shown that SEPA intensifies competition 
between banks. In another case where the marginal costs are constant in terms of the transaction 
volumes (   ), the large bank with greater capital sets lower transaction prices than the small bank 
while the small bank sets a lower fixed fee than the large bank. It was observed that there is a trade-
off between fixed fees and transaction prices. This means that where the transaction prices are low the 
fixed fee is high and vice versa. The lower transaction prices lead to increasing transaction volumes, 
and the higher fixed fee allows banks to extract more consumer surplus. Then, the comparison 
between pre- and post-SEPA has revealed the impact of SEPA on banks and customers. Given 
economies of scale, two banks would not make benefit equally from SEPA. The transaction pattern 
has a vital role in the competition between banks in post-SEPA. Based on results, if the share of cross-
border transaction is smaller than domestic one, then competition between banks is less intense in 
post-SEPA. This result is consistent with Leibbrandt (2010), and the implication is that the SEPA 
project favours the large bank. The consumer surplus improves because customers receive better 
services in post-SEPA. Further analysis has focused on economies of scale that would have been 
affected by SEPA. In this regard, the cost saving through relatively large economies of scale leads to 
vanishing asymmetries between banks. In this case, SEPA helps the small bank to catch up and obtain 
the same profit as the large bank. This result was expected by the EC about the outcome of the SEPA 
project. 
 
Further research will examine the enhancing cross-border competition due to lower entry barriers 




Proof of Proposition 1.  Given transaction prices equal marginal costs, fixed fee at equilibrium is 
obtained by: 
       =     
              ̂  ̂   ̂      ̂      ̅   
with          ,    
 
 
  [     ]. Using that        ̂    , The first order condition can be 
written as: 
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). Since    can be written as    
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 is given by: 
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By solving for   , I get 
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By following the similar steps,    is given by: 
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where          ̂      ̂ . Solving the above system of equations (A-1 and A-2) for    and   , 
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To determine whether (  
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 ) with         are optimal solution for the profit function  
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  [     ], I study the signs of leading principle minors of Hessian matrix. The 
Hessian of profit is given by 
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The leading principle minors show that the Hessian matrix is negative definite, and as a result there is 
not any incentives for bank   to deviate from    
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To check unique solutions, I study whether: 
 
  (    )    and    
 (     )    
  ̂ ( ̂   )    and   ̂ 
 ( ̂  ̂  )    
 
where   
           ,  ̂ 
   ̂   ̂  ̂   , and           ,  ̂  ̂      ̂ . Equations (3) and (4) 
satisfy the conditions   (    )    and  ̂ ( ̂   )   . Moreover, the first derivative of marginal 
costs with respect to transaction prices satisfy the conditions 
   
   
    and 
  ̂ 
  ̂ 
   . Thus, the 
equation           ) has a unique solution.  
 
To find the effect of transaction volumes on fixed fee, I compute the derivative of fixed fees in terms 
of transaction volume. In this regard, I get 
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The above derivative is positive when      
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 with   is large enough. There is one 
exceptional case that for      the above derivative is always positive. The fixed fee of bank   
decreases with transaction volumes of rival when     , or       with   is large enough or  
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The market share of bank   increases with its transaction volumes but decreases with the transaction 
volumes of rival when   , or     with  is  large enough, or     , since 
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Proof of Proposition 2. Given transaction price equals marginal cost, the fixed fee in the post-SEPA 
is acquired by:  
    ̃  ̃ =    ̃  ̃   ̃  ̃   ̃   ̃   ̃    ̅    
with  ̃  
 
 
    ̃   ̃  ,  ̃    ̃   ̃ , and          . The first order condition for bank   is: 
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  ̃ 
      ̃ 
 
  ̃   ̅   ̃   . 
25 
 
with    
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 ̃   with  ̃    ̃   ̃  into the above expressions, I get 
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By following the similar steps, I get 
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 ) characterised as optimal two-part tariff in the post-SEPA phase.  
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The sign of above derivative is positive when    
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fixed fee of bank   decreases with transaction volumes of rival when   
 
 
, or    , or     
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  is large enough, since 
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  .The market share of bank   increases with its 
transaction volumes but decreases with the transaction volumes of rival when   
 
 




  and  is large enough since 
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Proof of Proposition 3. In pre-SEPA with    ,       , and given    , I get 
  
    
      
    
     
The domestic transaction price charged by the large bank is less than the domestic transaction price 
charged by the small bank. It is straightforward to conclude that the cross-border transaction price 
charged by the large bank is less than the cross-border transaction price charged by the small bank 
since  ̂ 
     
     ̂ 
     






   
   ̂ 
      
   ̂ 
  
 
  ̅                  
and 
  
    
  
   
   ̂ 
      
   ̂ 
  
 
   
The expression of the fixed fee is simplified because of     . The fixed fee charged by the large 
bank is greater than the fixed fee charged by the small bank since it has larger transaction volumes. 




   
 
          ̂  
   
 




   
  
          ̂  
   
 
   
In post-SEPA with    ,      , and    , I get 
 ̃ 
    
     ̃ 
    
   . 
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 )
 
  ̅ 
with            The large bank with greater transaction volumes sets its fixed fee above the small 
bank since 
 ̃ 





    
 )    
As pre-SEPA, the fixed fee of bank i increases with    but decreases with    as long as 
  ̃ 
 
   
 
        
   
 
   
  ̃ 
 
   
  
        
   
 
    
  
Proof of Proposition 4. At equilibrium, from equation (14), the profit of bank   in pre-SEPA is given 
by 
  
    
   
 
   ̅     with           
Since   
     
 
   ̅ , I get the other expression for profit of bank   as follows: 





      with           
The difference between profit of the large bank and small bank is equal to 
  




   
     
    
The large bank has more profit than the small bank since it has greater market share. 






     with           
Similar to pre-SEPA, in post-SEPA, the large bank has more profit than the small bank since it has 
greater market share. 
  
Proof of Corollary 1. In order to study the relation between fixed fees of the large bank in the pre- 
and post-SEPA I compute: 
 ̃ 





    
  
   
   ̂ 
      








    
  
   
    
     ̂ 




The large bank sets higher fixed fee in the post-SEPA than pre-SEPA when 
  ̂   ̂  
       
  . This ratio 
always holds since the cross-border transaction is more expensive than the domestic one.  Similar 
analysis for the small bank gives 
 ̃ 
    
  
   
    
     ̂ 




The small bank sets higher fixed fee in the post-SEPA than pre-SEPA when 
 ̂   ̂ 
     
  , but this ratio 
never establishes. 
 
By considering   
      
   ̅ ,  ̃ 
     ̃ 
   ̅ , it follows that the large bank has greater market 
share in the post-SEPA than pre-SEPA but  the small bank loses market share in the post-SEPA than 
pre-SEPA. For sufficiently small fixed adjustment cost, the large bank makes more profit in the post-
SEPA than pre-SEPA.  
  
Proof of Corollary 2. 
1-  
The differences between domestic transaction prices charged by the large bank and the small bank in 
pre-SEPA is: 
  








   
 
For sufficiently high economies of scale, I get 
   
   
   
    
      








   
    
It shows that the difference between transaction prices deminishes when    . It is also satisfied for 
cross-border transaction prices as: 
 ̂ 
   ̂ 
    
    
      
        ̂ 
   ̂ 
            
    
    . 
Since  ̃   The result of post-SEPA is the same as for pre-SEPA: 
   
   
  ̃ 
   ̃ 
     
The differences between fixed fees of the large bank and the small bank in pre-SEPA diminish 
when    : 
      (  
    
 )     
   
 
 
(      
      ̂  
   (    )
 
 (   ̂ )
 
 )    with     
     . 
Similarly in post-SEPA: 
   
   
  ̃ 
   ̃ 




    




The market share of the large bank when     equals market share of the small bank in pre- and 
post-SEPA: 
  











So, they earn the same profit as 
  










   
2-  
The effect of greater economies of scale on consumer surplus is obtained by compting 
   
   
     






   
 ̃  




For sufficiently large economies of scale, consumer surplus converge to a certain amount. 
  
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